Russia - Ukraine War: Was It Inevitable?
By Prof. Dr. Sedat
LACINER -
Contrary to his past practices, President Vladimir Putin
sent Russian tanks and planes into Ukraine at a speed that no one expected and
almost without any preliminary mental preparation and softening the
international public opinion; attempted to brutally invade or even destroy a
sovereign country. I'm sure Putin and his advisers don't see it that way, and
I'm sure they wholeheartedly believe they are right, their actions seem
legitimate and legal to them. However, there are very few people in the world
who see the Ukraine War from Putin's point of view, and it would be unrealistic
to attribute this to Western propaganda alone.
The Western world knew that Putin was authoritarian and
unreliable, especially in domestic politics but he has never been considered as
an unpredictable or crazy in international relations. On the contrary, the
European Union (EU) and the US addressed Putin's Russia on many issues and saw
it as a partner to cooperate with. Russia has never considered as a true friend
to the West, but the risks posed by the collapse or destabilization of a huge
country like Russia were unacceptable. An extremely strong Russia as
experienced during the Cold War years could be a possible danger to European
security, on the other hand, an eminently debilitated Russia may also cause fatal
risks for the regional and global stability. Therefore, EU closely followed the
power games in Moscow and tried to keep its Russian policy in balance.
EXAGGERATION OF INTERDEPENDENCY?
The Liberal European policy-makers hoped that increasing
interdependency between Russia and the EU members in the post-Cold War era
could change Russian mind radically. According to this understanding Russia’s
dependency on the European goods and growing social and economic relations between
two sides would accordingly change ‘old Russia’ and make it a more moderate and
constructive country at the end of the day.
Although the Realist policy-makers never believed in
that the Russian nature was changeable they ironically came to a similar
conclusion with liberals and defended a new Containment Policy before any possible
serious confrontation could occur. Enlargement
of the EU and the NATO were seen as the best tools to keep Russia busy until
then, to buy time for the West and prepare for a possible conflict.
In fact, both approaches were far from meeting the
needs of Euro-Russian security relations and both were based on false, or at
least inadequate, assumptions: ‘Interdependence’ is an undeniable fact of
modern International Relations, but the degree of interdependence and its results
differ a lot according to geography of the sides, time and specific events. It
is obvious that economic interdependence and increasing relations between the
two communities will have political and military consequences in Euro-Russia
relations. But over-optimism about the direct effects of interdependency on
peace and security is misleading. Increasing social and economic mutual ties
cannot guarantee peace and stability in Euro-Russian relations in just a few
decades. Second, interdependency is a two-sided relationship, and its results do
not occur on one side only. Moreover, it is debatable who is more dependent on
whom in Euro-Russia relations. From the 1970s to the present, Western Europe's
dependence on Russian energy resources has been one of the most decisive
factors in the relations and has afforded Russian governments the luxury of
acting more independently in foreign policy.
SURROUNDING THE WORLD'S LARGEST COUNTRY
Similarly, surrounding Russia with countries friendly
to the West and gaining time for it was not an effective formula to avert the
impending catastrophe, a possible large-scale Euro-Russian war. You can't
besiege such a huge and great country with strong historical traditions like
Russia without being noticed. It is true, the containment policy simply worked during
the Cold War years and largely isolated Soviet Union, but in those years the
Western Bloc strongly fulfilled the requirements of the Containment Policy and
supported its allies militarily and politically. The West in those years was always
ready for a possible war with Russia different from the 2000s.
Although it did not fully meet its requirements, the
West nevertheless introduced a new type of containment policy against Moscow
and tried to bring Eastern European states to the Western bloc one by one, as
if Russia were unaware of what was going on. Russia, which emerged from the
Cold War with great losses and weakness, and still too dependent on western
loans could not respond adequately to this policy in the early decades, but it
was clear that Russia, which had recovered with oil and gas revenues under
Putin's authoritarian administration during the 2000s, would not remain silent
any longer.
As a matter of fact, a containment policy that has
been improved and reinterpreted according to the new conditions of the time and
its requirements have been fully met could be a good remedy to stop the
historical Russian irredentism and ‘aggressiveness’. However, the containment
remained so-called in many areas, and Russia was provoked while the West could
not strengthen militarily Ukraine and Georgia. It is true, the EU expanded its
borders very rapidly in the East, but the EU enlargement did not reach Ukraine
and the Caucasus. In addition, NATO has not been able to keep up with the pace
of EU enlargement. Thus, the policy of containing Russia turned into a
wait-and-see policy in several areas. Many politicians in Ukraine and Georgia
could not see this reality and found a deadly and unnecessary courage to pursue
anti-Russian policies even though they could not afford it.
THE BUKRESHT SUMMIT: DEADLY SIGNALS TO BOTH SIDES
In April 2008, Ukraine and Georgia officially
announced their desire to become a member of the NATO. Although Ukraine and
Georgia had no prospect of entering NATO for many years, possibly decades, the
NATO members at the Bucharest Summit irresponsibly delivered a promise that
Georgia and Ukraine “will become members of NATO”. Russian President Putin strongly
opposed the promise and declared that Russia saw such an attempt ‘existential
threat’.
Pseudo-membership status given to Georgia and Ukraine
made the two states uncompromising and more confident in the face of Russia.
Both Georgia and Ukraine left their guards against Russia and took unnecessary
adventurous steps from time to time. On the other hand, the thought that two
more border neighbors would become NATO members drove Moscow Government crazy
and it sought ways to stop this trend as soon as possible. Russia realized that
if it invaded any former Soviet republic, the West would not be able to give a
concrete response to it, its reaction would only be verbal condemnation and
nothing more. Another important lesson Russia learned from the NATO Summit was
that Russia had to act immediately before it was completely encircled, if it did
not act in time, Russia would not prevent its encirclement by the West in
coming years. Thus a few months later, Russia declared war and defeated Georgia
in a decisive five-day war. In short, empty promises to Ukraine and Georgia
opened the doors to disaster.
APPEASEMENT POLICY OR PAVING THE ROAD TO HELL
As a result of all these considerations mentioned
above, the West simply ignored or tolerated several unacceptable actions of
Russia and sought ways of reconciliation with Moscow. We all clearly witnessed all
the evidence of the West’s ‘appeasement policy’ towards Putin’s Russia in the occupation
of Georgia. When the bombs fell on Georgian territories nobody in the West turned
a hair. The Tbilisi Government, confronted Russia with the encouragement and
instigation of the West, was disappointed a lot.
The 2008 invasion of Georgia came after the wrong
signals given in the Bucharest Summit. In August 2008, Russia sent its Army
into Georgia to support separatists in two regions of Georgia, South Ossetia
and Abkhazia. The clashes between giant Russia and tiny Georgia lasted only
five days and killed hundreds, before the ceasefire. Georgia could not find the
backing it hoped for from its Western friends, particularly the United States.
As a result, Tbilisi Government desperately forced to accept the agreement
"favored Moscow". It is obvious that the West's weak response to the Georgian
conflict emboldened President Putin to eventually invade Ukraine. If NATO had
moved faster and accepted Georgia much earlier or at least had given large
amounts of military aid to Georgia, none of what followed would have happened.
Russia paid little price for violations of law in
Georgia and suffered few negative consequences as a result of its invasion. On
the other hand, a sovereign and respected member of the UN was divided into
several parts by Russia in front of the eyes of the entire world, and the
demographic structure in many parts of Georgia was redesigned by the Russians
according to ethnic differences.
The military aid that Georgia had expected never came,
but France ‘kindly’ offered to mediate between invading Russia and occupied
Georgia. The French stated ‘wisely’ that the problems between the two states
should be resolved not with weapons, but with diplomacy. Treating the aggressor
and the victim equally has only one meaning in International Relations, and
that is to legitimize the attack and support the occupier. Georgian
disappointment and Russian satisfaction with French diplomatic mediation can
easily be imagined.
ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA
A similar attitude was observed when Ukraine's Crimean
territory was occupied by Russia in 2014. A weak and ineffective reaction came
from the West when, in a fait accompli, the gigantic and strategic territory of
a sovereign state, a member of the United Nations, was declared Russian territory
in one day. The annexation of Crimea by a permanent member state of the UN
Security Council was not only unlawful but also a deadly attack on the UN principles
and system of states established in 1945.
The US and the EU responded to the annexation of
Crimea by enacting fruitless sanctions against Russia for its role in the crisis
and urged Russia to withdraw. NATO members further deployed combat battalions
to front line countries bordering Russia. However, Russia considered these
reactions as a kind of intimidation and did not think that NATO would resort to
arms for Ukraine in the short term. Russia furthermore deployed more troops to the
western borders and engaged in saber - rattling rhetoric, advocating the use of
tactical nuclear weapons as a deterrent. Putin knowing the weaknesses of the
West played on the West's fears and tried to underline that a war for Ukraine
was not worth it. While reminding the EU members of the possible heavy costs of
the war for them, Putin also made them feel that Russia is ready for any kind
of war and any cost for the Crimean lands.
Weighing the military and political measures taken by
NATO, Putin predicted that the West could not risk a hot war to prevent the
annexation of Crimea, and he was not wrong in his assessment. As experienced in
the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, Western leaders could not dare to engage in hot
conflict to stop Russia, thus unwittingly paved the way for the invasion of
Ukraine.
The invasion of Crimea was perhaps the last chance to
prevent a major war in the region, but such a precious opportunity was wasted
thoughtlessly and generously.
Had there been another leader in Putin's place, he/she
would have seen Europe's disorganization, indecision and inadequacy in the
field of defense as a great opportunity and could exploit this and seize much
larger Ukrainian territories without firing a single shot.
If Russia for example had applied the ‘salami slicing tactic’
from the very beginning for the annexation of the Luhanks and Donetsk regions,
the West would have continued its weak and ineffective reactions against Russia.
Putin just needed more time to occupy more Ukrainian territories, but he could
not wait and impatiently attempted to invade Ukraine at once as a whole, at the
cost of jeopardizing a victory he could have achieved at little cost in the
long run.
IMPATIENT PUTIN’S DREAMS
The main motivation for Putin's sudden attack on
Ukraine was emotional and subjective rather than logical and concrete ones. The
Russian President aimed to go down in history as a new great Russian Tsar. He
did not see Ukraine as an independent, sovereign and a real state separate from
Russia, on the contrary, he regarded the Ukrainian lands as the birthplace of
the Russian nation and his own homeland. This behavior was not the one expected
from Putin. Among Russian experts, Putin, as a former KGB member, was known for
his composure, patience, and strong logic. That is why, Russia's attempt to
invade Ukraine completely surprised everyone, especially the experts studying
Russian politics.
On 24 February 2022, Russian troops entered the
Ukrainian territories and how emotional and dreamy Putin was was revealed in
the very first days of the attack. Russia besieging Ukraine with about 200,000
soldiers sought to seize the capital, Kiev, with almost all its might. Putin assessed
that Russian Army could finish the occupation of Ukraine in a short time, maybe
in a few weeks, as seen in the Georgia War. But first, the Russian tanks were
almost stuck in the swamp, and they could not get beyond a certain line.
Ukraine's fighting skills played a major role in halting the Russian advance,
but the real problem was the unpreparedness and poor organization capacity of
the Russian Army. Even the needed logistics for such a big operation could not
be provided by the Russian statecraft. In the first days of the war, it was
understood that the Russian tanks were not as powerful as it was thought, and
the "top secret Russian weapons" that Russia had been talking about
for years never came to light. As a result, Russia had to revise its war plans
many times in a short time.
A PREVENTABLE WAR?
The Ukrainian War will perhaps be one of the most
important factors shaping the Europe of the future. It is not possible to see
Russia's attack on Ukraine as an ordinary conflict or as one of Russia's usual
attacks. The war has already upset the economic balance of the entire world and
brought the total war fears of World War II to the heart of Europe. Russia and
the West came to the brink of hot war again after decades. The results of the
Ukraine War will determine how the new world order will be formed.
Unfortunately, the US, EU and NATO could not sufficiently realize the meaning
of Russia's expansion desires on the former Soviet territories, or they could
not do what they needed to do with integrity and determination. The West's
attitude towards the 2008 Georgian War and the 2014 Annexation of Crimea
consisted of giving empty promises to its friends and provoking the aggressor.
Open violations of International Law went unpunished, and this attitude has
invited new conflicts. If Ukraine and Georgia had been strengthened militarily
at the time, if billions of dollars of military aid to Ukraine today had been
made to these countries 15 years ago, the great conflict could have been
delayed or even prevented. If NATO did not intend to provide the aid and
reinforcements mentioned above, it should have told Ukraine and Georgia openly
and should not mislead them.
As discussed above, Russia has also made many tactical
and strategic major miscalculations regarding Ukraine. If Putin had continued
to exploit the West's aversion to war and its policy of appeasement and had
been a little more patient, he could have achieved his national goals in the
long run without any need for a bloody war. Russia has tried to bite the morsel
that it could not swallow, namely Ukraine. There are many domestic reasons for
the Russian mistakes, but the wrong signals given to Russia by the West also played
a key role in this. At this point, Russia's failure as well as its success will
be a big problem for the world. If Russia had succeeded in invading Ukraine in
a few weeks as initially thought, it would have cost the West and the region
heavy. However, an embarrassment and defeat for Russia in Ukraine could cause
much bigger problems for everyone. Russia can take the war to a much greater
scale and level, which is called world war
Originally published: November 2022. Academic Papers, No. 1.
Transilation: M. Keskin
Keywords: Ukraine, Russia, NATO, EU, European Union, US, war, Georgia
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About the author: Sedat Laçiner
is an International Relations professor. Writer, academic and columnist Laçiner
is the author of several books and articles about International Politics,
International Security and Turkish Foreign Policy. Prof. Laçiner is the former
director of the USAK, Ankara-based Turkish think tank, and former President of
the Canakkale University. BA (Ankara University, Turkey), MA (University of
Sheffield, UK) and PhD (King’s College London, University of London)
e-mail:
sedatlaciner72@gmail.com
https://twitter.com/sedatlaciner72
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